Introduction
The uncertainty associated with early-stage ventures poses serious challenges for financial intermediaries (Hall and Lerner, 2010) . Kaplan et al. (2009) find that a venture's nonhuman capital assets form early and remain relatively stable, suggesting that investing in ex-ante better ideas could generate considerable value-if investors could assess them effectively. A substantive literature focuses on the selection preferences of venture capitalists (VCs) and angel investors, i.e., on the criteria by which they invest (Quindlen, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Bernstein et al., 2015) ; in contrast, systematic evidence on investors' ability to screen early-stage ideas is scant. In this paper, we study whether early-stage venture ideas that receive more positive subjective evaluations from a large number of start-up experts, including experienced investors, are more likely to commercialize in the future. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first direct empirical evidence on the conditions under which ex-ante assessment of an early-stage venture idea predicts its future outcome.
Empirically, it is difficult to examine the efficacy of evaluators' ex-ante assessments due to the identification challenges inherent in venture financing. Ventures that elicit positive evaluations from investors receive additional resources that positively influence their outcomes. 1 Entrepreneurs may also alter the amount of effort they expend on a venture in response to positive or negative evaluations, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, investors' complex evaluation mechanisms make it challenging to distinguish the assessment of ideas from other factors. 2 In the absence of well-identified empirical studies, existing evidence on the plausibility of idea 1 A large body of literature describes various mechanisms whereby venture capitalists professionalize ventures and improve their outcomes, such as active mentorship, network access, and control rights (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2004) . See also Kerr et al. (2014a) and Lerner et al. (2015) on the impact of angel investors, and Lerner (1999) and Howell (2015) on the impact of government grants.
2 For instance, Bernstein et al. (2015) show that angel investors are highly responsive to information about the founding team.
screening is inconclusive and largely anecdotal. Kerr et al. (2014a) and Kerr et al. (2014b) find weak correlations between assessment of a venture by angel investors and venture capitalists at the time of financing and its subsequent performance conditional on receiving funding; however, funded ventures are a small subset of the full sample of ventures evaluated by investors, and thus do not shed light on investors' overall ability to differentiate among early-stage venture ideas. 3 Even the most successful investors assert that screening early-stage venture ideas is a highly noisy process. Paul Graham, one of the most prominent investors in Silicon Valley, points out that "if a good idea were obviously good, someone else would already have done it" (Graham, 2012) . Graham's partner at Y Combinator, Sam Altman, notes that "for all of the really good seed investments I've made, other investors I respected thought they were bad ideas" (Altman, 2014) .
In this study we find that the efficacy of screening ideas varies by sector. More specifically, we show that succinct summaries of business ideas, even at an early stage, can be used to predict ventures' subsequent outcomes among ventures in R&D-intensive sectors such as life sciences and hardware. 4 In contrast, these summaries of business ideas do not predict outcomes for ventures in non-R&D-intensive sectors such as consumer web and mobile apps. To overcome the aforementioned empirical constraints, we leverage Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Venture Mentoring Service (VMS), a free educational service that helps aspiring MIT-affiliated entrepreneursalumni, post-docs, and students-develop their nascent business ideas. We collect detailed data on the characteristics, assessment, and subsequent outcomes of 652 ventures that joined VMS between 2005 and 2012. The majority of these ventures are serious entrepreneurial endeavors and not recreational pursuits. In nearly half of the sample, the MIT-affiliated entrepreneurs pursued the venture full-time, forgoing traditional employment and attractive salaries. 5 These ventures have raised over $700 million from venture financing.
When an entrepreneur enrolls at VMS, all currently active mentors-on average, a pool of over 100 experienced local practitioners who have worked extensively with early-stage venturesreceive an objective, standardized summary of the proposed venture, composed by a VMS staff member. Each summary describes the venture idea-the proposed business model and technology, target customers, and current challenges-but provides limited information about the entrepreneur and founding team; the summaries are consistent in form and tone. On the strength of the summary alone, without meeting the entrepreneurs, mentors must decide whether they want to work with a venture; they do not make the decision lightly. 6 We find that venture ideas that elicit a high degree of initial mentor interest are more likely to ultimately reach commercialization, defined as having recurring revenue and expenses associated with the sale of products and/or services in keeping with the company's business objective. We then show that the predictive power of aggregate mentor interest varies by industry sector. Initial mentor interest strongly and significantly predicts eventual commercialization for ventures in research-and-development (R&D)-intensive sectors. 7 Among ventures in R&D-intensive sectors, a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of mentors who express interest in a venture idea implies, on average, a 21-percent increase in the likelihood of commercialization (or a 6-percentage-point increase over the baseline probability of 28.5 percent). In contrast, the coefficient estimate on aggregate mentor interest is weak and insignificant among ventures in non-R&D-intensive sectors. 8 These findings are robust to using angel and/or VC financing as an alternative 5 Average starting salaries for MIT graduates are around $60,000 per year for those with bachelor's degrees and $70,000-$120,000 for those with graduate degrees (Hastings et al., 2010) . 6 Mentors on average express interest in fewer than 5 percent of the ventures they review. 7 Following the National Science Foundation (2006), we define hardware, energy, and life sciences and medical devices as R&D-intensive sectors.
8 The non-R&D-intensive sectors include consumer web/mobile, enterprise software, and consumer products.
outcome measure.
One potential concern for the interpretation of our results is that aggregate mentor interest may systematically influence either ventures' access to mentoring resources or entrepreneurs' effort.
However, this is unlikely to be the case because of several institutional factors discussed in Section 2: in brief, VMS provides entrepreneurs with equal access to its mentoring resources; only a semirandom subset of the mentors who initially express interest in a venture ultimately interact with it, and few if any become heavily involved. Furthermore, neither entrepreneurs nor mentors are aware of the magnitude of aggregate mentor interest. Our empirical analysis also controls for venture/mentor interactions and shows that our results are robust to using alternative measures of mentor interest, to including only the subsample of ventures that interact minimally with VMS mentors, and to using specifications at the venture/mentor-pairing level that control for mentormeeting fixed effects.
We also present four sets of evidence to demonstrate that mentors are recognizing high-quality ideas as opposed to excluding non-serious ideas. First, our results are robust to excluding ventures that elicit low interest. Second, the predictive power of mentor interest is strong within the subset of ventures in R&D-intensive sectors with documented intellectual capital-that is, ventures that are based on academic research or that have filed for intellectual-property protection at the time of evaluation. Third, our key findings hold for the subsample of venture ideas that entrepreneurs decided to pursue full-time. Finally, we find that within the sample of ventures that received VC financing, aggregate mentor interest is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of a successful exit (acquisition or initial public offering).
By investigating the centrality of the initial idea in predicting entrepreneurial success, we build on the literature on critical resources and theories of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Hart and Moore, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 2001a,b) . Bhide (2003) finds that initial business concepts often change and broaden during the idea-formation stage, a finding that appears to be at odds with Kaplan et al. (2009) . Rajan (2012) and Bernstein et al. (2015) note that this inconsistency may be stage-specific within the life cycle of a new venture, in which different assets-physical, intellectual, and humancapital assets-are critical at different stages. Our results suggest that firms in different sectors form around different critical resources even at very early stages: those in R&D-intensive sectors are more likely to form around intellectual assets than those in non-R&D-intensive sectors. Thus the contradictory evidence in the previous literature may also be attributable to the varied sector affiliations of the ventures in their samples. 9
Our focus on the earliest stage in a venture's lifecycle is valuable, since young firms are increasingly attracting resources from early-stage financial intermediaries (Ewens et al., 2015; Cohen and Hochberg, 2015) . At such an early stage, uncertainty is likely to be highest and returns may be ex-ante unknown, thus a growing literature argues that early-stage investors should encourage experimentation and tolerate early failures (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Manso, 2011; Kerr et al., 2014b; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2015) . We contribute to this literature by demonstrating the heterogeneity in the predictability of outcomes for early-stage ventures. Finally, the feasibility of accurate early assessment of idea quality has implications for the allocation of entrepreneurial human capital, and thus our study also relates to the literature on the risks and returns of entrepreneurship (Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Hall and Woodward, 2010) . 9 Of the 100 firms interviewed by Bhide (2003) , 72 are in computer-related industries, business services, or consumer goods. Of the 50 firms studied by Kaplan et al. (2009) , only 15 are in software/IT, and 25 are in biotechnology, telecom, or healthcare. In our sample of 652 venture ideas, 221 are in hardware, life sciences and medical devices, and energy; 384 are in consumer web/mobile, enterprise software, and consumer products.
MIT Venture Mentoring Service
Universities are instrumental in fostering high-impact entrepreneurship and stimulating local economic activity (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). MIT alumni have founded over 25,000 active companies that have collectively employed over 3 million people and generated annual worldwide sales of $2 trillion (Roberts and Eesley, 2009) . Founded in 2000, MIT's Venture Mentoring Service is one of the university's longest-running programs designed to promote entrepreneurship and innovation via entrepreneurship education. Entrepreneurs from the larger MIT communitystudents, staff, alumni, and faculty-approach VMS with an idea, often in an early form, and receive customized advice from a team of elite volunteer mentors. VMS thus uses very earlystage ideas as the context for providing prospective entrepreneurs a hands-on, practical learning experience. The service is confidential and free of charge.
VMS Mentors
The volunteer mentors at VMS are experts in business formation and development who have typically acquired entrepreneurial experience in one of three ways: by founding and growing a new company, by leading a new business initiative at an established company, or by providing functional services (e.g. financial or legal) to startups. The majority of VMS mentors have either founded a company or joined a startup very early on. A fair number of these mentors are serial entrepreneurs; others have stayed put and become senior executives as a startup grew into a large company. Most of the remaining mentors have led new business initiatives (e.g., new product lines, new divisions, new markets) at established firms and encountered many of the same issues that entrepreneurs face. A few mentors specialize in particular functional areas, such as finance; they may lack direct startup experience, but they have interacted extensively with startups.
Considerable care is taken to ensure that the program remains focused on its educational aims and provides objective advice to entrepreneurs. Mentors are not compensated for their time, and are carefully screened by VMS staff. An in-depth interview looks for a compelling focus and an interest in helping entrepreneurs; prospective mentors with other personal or business agendas are not accepted. 10 Every mentor must sign an agreement that specifies rigorous guidelines and a code of ethics that encourages transparency and limits conflicts of interest. VMS monitors mentor activity and promptly dismisses mentors who violate these principles. On rare occasions, a venture will offer a member of its mentor team a more formal role, such as board director. If the mentor accepts such a role, he or she must resign from the mentor team for that venture.
VMS estimates that active mentors average over 100 hours of volunteer time annually. Mentors report that they do so for a variety of reasons. Among the most commonly articulated motivations are the intellectual appeal of the work, continuing engagement in the Greater Boston entrepreneurship community, and the satisfaction of promoting the development of new entrepreneurs. Mentors share a sense that, in the words of one mentor, "mentoring entrepreneurs is a way to give back for all the help that I received in my career." In addition to volunteer mentors, VMS consists of a small team of full-time staff members, including two mentors-in-residence.
Initial Screening of Venture Ideas
To be eligible for mentoring, an entrepreneur must be affiliated with MIT (e.g., alumni, postdocs, and students) and based in the Greater Boston area. Given the educational nature of the program, VMS imposes only minimal requirements on eligible entrepreneurs and their ideas: the only criteria are serious interest in learning about entrepreneurship and an idea that will provide a context and focus for practical entrepreneurship education. Entrepreneurs typically come to VMS very early. They may have conducted preliminary research on the feasibility of the idea, but they usually do not have a business plan, a strategy and revenue model, or a team. Few entrepreneurs are pursuing a venture idea full-time when they join VMS, and few of their ventures are incorporated or funded.
Matching Venture Ideas with Mentors
VMS follows a standardized routine to match new ventures to their initial mentor teams. Here we describe the matching procedures employed by VMS during our study period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , which we also summarize in Figure A .1 in the Appendix.
To receive mentoring from VMS, entrepreneurs must first complete a short enrollment form.
Drawing on the form and an initial consultation with the entrepreneur(s), a staff member distills the venture idea into a concise standardized summary for purposes of dissemination to mentors; the same staff member prepared almost all of these summaries throughout our sample period. The summary includes the following information:
• a straightforward description of what the venture intends to do, free of buzzwords and technical jargon
• information on potential customers and products
• the type of help the venture needs, and any relevant challenges, problems, and/or known issues (e.g., intellectual-property and legal problems)
• brief information on the founding entrepreneur(s), e.g., whether they are MIT alumni, staff, or students For ventures of a technological nature, the feasibility of the underlying technology is rarely questioned. Challenges and problems are not ignored, however; they shed light on the assistance entrepreneurs will need. VMS regularly emails venture summaries, in batches, to all active VMS mentors; the summaries are also delivered in printed form and orally at monthly meetings of mentors. Mentors then respond, indicating interest in working with a given venture. Because mentors do so via email or on paper, they evaluate ventures independently and only VMS is aware of the aggregate interest level.
An expression of interest indicates willingness to commit time to a venture, and mentors do not do so lightly. On average, mentors express interest in fewer than 5 percent of the ventures to which they are exposed. Interviews with mentors suggest that the appeal of the underlying technology and/or business idea is the primary driver of interest. For instance, one mentor reports basing interest on the "novelty of the idea and whether it offers some positive value to some group of people and/or the planet." Sometimes, mentors also consider the relevance of their experience and knowledge. But not all mentors look for ventures that hew closely to their own backgrounds.
A mentor who reports being "most intrigued by the ventures that are the furthest from my own professional experiences" speaks for many mentors.
It is important to note that mentor interest is not used as a metric in program evaluation. VMS uses mentor-interest data only in the initial mentor venture pairing process and sets the initial mentor team size to two to four volunteer mentors (excluding the professional VMS staff members).
Because more mentors typically express interest than can join the team, only a semi-random subset of mentors expressing interest in a venture interacts with the venture. VMS assembles the mentor team in light of a set of factors that include mutual scheduling constraints and load balancing. Entrepreneurs do not learn the aggregate mentor interest they attract, nor do they select their initial mentor team.
Mentoring at VMS
VMS ensures that access to mentoring resources does not differ systematically across entrepreneurs and ventures. After being paired with mentor teams, entrepreneurs largely determine the extent of mentoring they receive. Meetings are initiated by the entrepreneurs; VMS attempts to accommodate all requests, and checks in regularly with ventures to assure that its records on their status are up to date.
VMS measures the effectiveness of mentoring primarily via the feedback from entrepreneurs; internal evaluation of the program is largely qualitative. Objective metrics include the size of the program (the number of active mentors and entrepreneurs), its rate of growth, mentors' engagement (e.g., hours committed), and entrepreneurs' evaluations. In keeping with the focus on entrepreneurial education, VMS does not consider its ventures' rate of commercialization or successful exit a key performance metric. "We think it's a success if the prospective entrepreneur decides there isn't a viable business," remarked a VMS staff member, "or that they really don't want to be an entrepreneur now that they get what you really have to do [to be successful]." Assessment of the VMS program is beyond the scope of this paper, but the program is highly regarded by the entrepreneurship community, individual entrepreneurs, and university educators alike. Over 40 institutions worldwide-including Harvard University, Yale University, Columbia University, and New York University-have established mentoring programs based on the VMS model. At MIT, VMS complements a rich array of other services, centers, programs, clubs, and initiatives, both academic and extracurricular, that support innovation and entrepreneurship. 11 We do not claim that the effect of mentoring on ventures is unvarying. Our identifying assumption is, rather, that the level of mentor interest expressed at the time of venture enrollment does not systematically cause the intensity of mentoring to differ. Generally speaking, a mentor is unlikely to become as heavily involved as a typical investor. This is the case for two reasons. First, entrepreneurs request meetings based on their own needs and not on mentors' schedules. Given the ad hoc nature of these meetings, the entire mentor team may not attend. Second, the mentor team may change over time as different kinds of knowledge, skills, and experience become more useful. Later-stage mentors are not limited to those who initially expressed interest in the venture.
In many cases, in fact, later mentor venture pairings are based on the specific skills of the mentor and/or facilitated by informal meetings at VMS events. Figure 1 plots the number of new ventures that joined VMS during our sample period by starting year and month. We exclude seven ventures that had already been funded before joining VMS since they had progressed further than the typical venture that affiliates with VMS at the idea stage. Also, third-party validation by investors might have influenced the evaluations of VMS mentors. We also exclude ten ventures founded by MIT faculty, which may have special standing in the university ecosystem. Our resulting sample consists of 652 ventures.
Panel A of Table 1 Table 1 shows that students and alumni respectively generate around 38.3 percent and 36.7 percent of venture ideas. The rest come from postdoctoral fellows, research associates, and staff. Around 7.7 percent of the venture ideas in our sample belong to entrepreneurs previously mentored by VMS on a different project.
Mentor Sample
The We collect detailed data on mentors' backgrounds and expertise by means of surveys and online searches. Table 2 reports mentors' mean characteristics. Around 85 percent of mentors are male; only a few (22.3 percent) have a Ph.D. or M.D. We define a mentor's primary sector as the industry in which he or she has worked longest to date (as self-reported or extracted from online career histories). In this classification scheme each mentor has a single primary sector. The three most populous primary sectors are hardware (24.7 percent), life sciences and medical devices (21.5 percent), and enterprise software (21.1 percent). The sector most popular with ventures, consumer web and mobile, is the primary sector of only 6.8 percent of mentors.
Measuring Initial Mentor Interest
We use two variables to measure aggregate mentor interest: the percentage and the number of active mentors who express interest in a venture shortly after the venture joins VMS. 12 To accommodate delayed responses from mentors and delayed recording of their responses in VMS's electronic system, we include all indications of interest expressed within two months of a venture's eligibility for mentoring. 13 On average, a new venture interests around 4.5 percent of active mentors, or 6.3 mentors. 14 The median number of interested mentors is 6. Figure 2 shows the kernel density 12 The denominator in the percentage of mentors expressing interest is the number of mentors who were actively involved with VMS at the time, excluding mentors who had not yet joined VMS or who had already left the program. 13 Our results are also robust to using a threshold of 1.5 months or three months. 14 On average, a summary of a new venture is sent to 144 active mentors.
of aggregate mentor interest measured as a proportion, and a histogram of interest measured as a count.
Measuring Mentoring Intensity
As noted in Section 2, mentors' initial evaluation of a venture is unlikely to systematically make for differential mentoring resources. The educational structure of the program is designed to maximize entrepreneurs' access to mentoring resources regardless of the potential of their ideas. Nonetheless, we capture the degree of mentoring intensity at the extensive margin using two variables: the number of mentors who have met with the venture at least twice and the number of a venture's meetings at VMS, both measured at the time of data collection. The former measure controls for the relationships that entrepreneurs may have formed with VMS mentors. 15 The latter measure uses number of meetings instead of frequency of meetings to capture VMS's total impact on a venture. 16 Though we do not observe all channels whereby mentors and ventures could interact (such as email), we expect that, on average, ventures that have had more recorded interactions with their mentor teams have received more mentoring. We use additional robustness checks to investigate whether variations in the degree of mentoring at the intensive margin drive our key results.
The average venture in our sample meets with VMS mentors only around three times, and has repeated interactions with fewer than two mentors (see Table 1 ). Around 36 percent of ventures never meet with VMS mentors or do so only once; 40 percent never interact with any mentor more than once. The correlations between initial mentor interest and venture mentor interactions are weakly positive (see Figure 3 ).
Measuring Venture Outcomes and Milestones
Our primary outcome of interest is whether or not a venture successfully reaches the stage of commercialization, characterized by recurring revenue and expenses associated with sales of the products and/or services that are the business objective of the company, and by a reasonable expectation of repeat business and new customers. We capture this outcome using public sources, including product listings on popular sites like Amazon.com, news articles, and press releases. Our definition of commercialization excludes revenue from one-off "consulting services" or "pilot-test fees,"
which are often employed as bootstrap financing vehicles but do not advance the business objective. In the rare cases of business models based on licensing, forging technology-licensing deal(s) is considered commercialization. Commercialized ventures are those whose products and/or services have been validated by the market. Although commercialization is not necessarily the end-goal, it is an important milestone; commercialization has been used as a key outcome measure in other studies of early-stage ventures such as Howell (2015).
We also collect data on two additional entrepreneurial milestones to measure the progress of each venture. We consider a venture to be launched if at least one of its founding entrepreneurs has ever pursued it full-time. This definition excludes cases in which entrepreneurs pursue a venture part-time while attending school or holding a job. We also measure whether a venture has ever received funding from angel investors and/or venture capitalists. We exclude crowdfunding, government grants, and investments by friends and family from our definition, since the criteria and purposes of such funding channels vary widely. Collectively, these measures portray the growth and impact of a venture idea. VMS tracks ventures' receipt of funding; we hand-collected the other data using VMS's archives and internet searches.
Because we aim to determine how far a venture has progressed to date, our outcomes do not necessarily describe its current status. Instead, our outcomes are intended to capture a venture's potential economic impact. Some newer ventures were still pursuing intermediate milestones in
summer 2014 when we collected outcome data. This censoring may cause our data to underestimate the likelihood that ventures in our sample eventually reach commercialization, biasing against finding a positive relationship between initial mentor interest and commercialization.
In our sample, 46.5 percent of ventures launched, 18.6 percent raised funding from professional investors, and 22.4 percent ultimately commercialized (see Table 1 
where i denotes a venture and MENTOR_INTEREST is either the proportion or the count of active mentors who express initial interest in a venture idea as discussed in Sections 3.3.
The key coefficient of interest is β, which measures whether a venture idea that attracts more mentor interest in its initial form is more likely to be commercialized in the future. To control for the effects of venture age and seasonality, we include dummies for the year and the month that a venture joins VMS. Some venture characteristics, such as industry sector or underlying technological intensity, could drive both mentor interest and commercial viability. We thus include a rich set of controls to determine whether mentors can accurately evaluate a venture's commercial viability beyond picking up on these characteristics. We control for variables that reflect the underlying business proposition by including whether the venture is based on academic research, whether it possesses intellectual property when it joins VMS, and dummies for its industry sector.
We control for the venture's stage of development by including a dummy on whether it has a legal business entity (that is, whether it is incorporated) at the time of entry. We further control for the entrepreneur's characteristics by including whether he or she is an MIT student or alumnus and whether he or she has been previously mentored by VMS. 17 To capture the possible nonlinear effect of mentoring, we include dummies for the number of mentors who have met with the venture at least twice and for the number of meetings that a venture has had at VMS. that, controlling only for the starting year and month, a venture that elicits more initial interest from mentors when it first joins VMS is more likely to subsequently commercialize. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate is economically important and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Main Results
A one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of active mentors expressing interest, which is 2.68 percentage points, implies on average a 5.36-percentage-point increase in the probability of recurring revenue and expenses, or a 23.9 percent increase over the baseline probability of 22.4 percent.
Columns (1) that mentoring has no effect on a venture's development: entrepreneurs may be more likely to seek assistance both when the venture is struggling and when it is progressing rapidly. Consistent with the institutional setting, including the venture mentor interactions has negligible impact on our key coefficient estimate on aggregate mentor interest, other coefficient estimates, and R 2 .
Our preferred specification is column (6). After controlling for venture and entrepreneur characteristics at entry and the degree of mentoring at the extensive margin, the proportion of active mentors expressing initial interest in a venture has an economically meaningful, positive, and statistically significant relationship with its likelihood of commercialization. All else equal, a venture that attracts a one-standard-deviation (or 2.68 percentage point) higher degree of interest is on average 3.75 percentage points (or 16.75 percent) more likely to reach commercialization. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
To show that the outliers eliciting extremely high or low mentor interest are not driving our results, column (7) excludes the venture ideas that attracted the top or bottom 5 percent in aggregate mentor interest; and the coefficient estimate on aggregate mentor interest becomes even stronger.
Column (8) uses the number of mentors expressing interest, instead of the proportion measure used previously, and yields the same finding qualitatively and quantitatively as column (6). A onestandard-deviation increase in the count of mentor interest implies on average a 3.83 percentage point (or 17.10 percent) increase in the likelihood of commercialization.
We next increase the flexibility of our main specification by using dummy variables for the quintile of mentor interest relative to other ventures in the same sector, which allows us to in-vestigate whether mentors distinguish between ideas at the lower and higher ends of the quality distribution. Figure 4 plots the coefficient estimates. Compared to ventures in the lowest quintile, being in the next two quintiles (between the 20-percent and 60-percent percentiles) results in similar likelihoods of commercialization, even though mentor interest varies considerably. (The 60-percent percentile in a given sector interests between 4 to 7 percent of mentors, or 7 to 12 mentors by count). In contrast, the likelihood of commercialization increases markedly in the fourth quintile (the 60-80-percent percentiles) and even more in the top quintile. These patterns suggest that the predictability of outcomes is driven by ideas that elicit above-median mentor interest.
(Ventures in the top quintile interest on average 8 percent of mentors, or 11.9 mentors by count).
Robustness Checks
In this section we provide several robustness checks on our main results. Table 4 uses three tests to show that systematic variations in mentor engagement are unlikely to drive the relationship between mentor interest and venture outcome. In columns (1) and (2), we measure aggregate mentor interest as the proportion or count of mentors who express initial interest but never meet with the venture. These mentors have thus not had a chance to directly influence the development of the venture. Using more restrictive measures of aggregate mentor interest yields coefficient estimates and standard errors almost identical to columns (6) and (8) in Table 3 . Thus our key findings are not driven by mentors who express interest, meet with the venture, and may thus be particularly engaged with it.
In columns (3) and (4), we investigate the role of mentor-team recruitment. When an insufficient number of mentors expresses interest in working with a venture, VMS formally recruits another mentor and/or member of the staff to complete the mentor team. Though contrary to VMS principles, it is conceivable that recruited mentors are less engaged than those who expressed ini-tial interest, and as a result discourage entrepreneurs from engaging with VMS and/or pursuing the venture. We show that this is not the case: the relationship between aggregate mentor interest and commercialization remains unchanged when we include only the ventures that elicited initial interest from more than four mentors-the maximum initial mentor team size-and therefore did not need recruited mentors.
Mentor engagement may vary for a variety of other reasons. Thus in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 we restrict our empirical analysis to ventures that have had limited interactions with mentors-that is, those that have had two or fewer meetings with mentors and no repeated interactions with an individual mentor. Examining only these 259 ventures yields results similar to those generated by the full sample. Unreported regressions show that the results in columns (3)- (6) of Table 4 also hold if we use the more restrictive measures of aggregate mentor interest from columns (1) and (2)-that is, the proportion or count of mentors who express initial interest but never meet with the venture. Thus, our key results hold among ventures where variations in the degree and/or quality of mentoring are more likely to be limited.
Next, we control for the heterogeneous effects that mentors may have on ventures' development using data at the venture mentor pairing level using the following specifications:
where i denotes a venture, m denotes a mentor, and each observation is a pairing between the two. meeting with a mentor could have on a venture's probability of commercialization. We include controls for venture and entrepreneur characteristics and timing of entry to VMS as included in Equation (1) and defined previously. As in the case of the main specification, the key coefficient of interest is β, which measures whether a venture idea that attracts more initial mentor interest is more likely to be commercialized in the future. Table 5 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (2) with different measures of mentor interest and various degrees of controls. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the venture level.
In columns (1)- (3), the key independent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if an active mentor expresses initial interest in a venture, regardless of whether they meet later. Column (1) does not control for any venture mentor interactions; the specification is thus similar to column (3) in Table 3 . Column (2) includes a dummy that equals 1 if the mentor has met with the venture.
The meeting dummy thus captures the average effect of meeting with a mentor; the effect does not vary by mentor. Column (3) allows the mentors to have heterogeneous effects on ventures by including the 251 mentor-meeting dummies. In all three specifications, the coefficient estimate on mentor interest is positive and statistically significant. The estimates on mentor interest in column (2) and (3) are identical, indicating that controlling for variations in mentor-meeting effects does not affect our main results. In columns (4)- (6) of Table 5 , we repeat the exercise using the more restrictive measure of mentor interest, which is 1 if the mentor expresses interest in the venture and the pair never meet. The coefficient estimate on mentor interest remains positive and statistically significant. Thus, our results are not driven by systematic matching of ventures that elicit more interest with higher-quality mentors.
In summary, the main specification demonstrates, by controlling for venture/mentor interactions, that our results are not driven by variations in the degree of mentoring at the extensive margin. The robustness checks in this section further substantiate that the results are not driven by variations in mentor engagement or quality. A remaining concern is that a venture eliciting more mentor interest may be matched to a mentor team whose skills are particularly well aligned with the venture's needs, conditional on mentor quality. We cannot directly rule out this hypothesis since we do not have the statistical power to control for heterogeneous treatment effects at the venture/mentor level. However, it is counterintuitive to conclude that any remaining variations in venture/mentor fit drive our key results, given that the controls for venture/mentor interactions have a negligible effect on the relationship between mentor interest and subsequent commercialization. Furthermore, our results are robust to restricting the sample of analysis to ventures that had only few interactions with mentors and whose mentoring is thus likely to vary minimally in degree and/or quality (columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 ).
Heterogeneity across Venture Sectors
To this point we have assumed that the predictive power of mentor interest is constant across ventures even though the nature of their underlying ideas may vary considerably, particularly across sectors. Table 1 shows that, compared to other ventures, those in R&D-intensive sectors are more likely to have documented intellectual capital-to be based on academic research and/or to possess IP at entry-and to be incorporated when they join VMS. We explore heterogeneity across sectors and estimate:
where we use the same controls as in our preferred specification, reported in column (6) of Table   3 . Thus β 1 measures the relationship between mentors' initial interest and the venture's outcome for ventures in sectors characterized by intensive R&D, and β 2 measures the same relationship for ventures in other sectors. The R&D-intensive sectors in our sample are hardware, energy, and life sciences and medical devices. We report the results using the proportion of active mentors who express interest; the results using a count are nearly identical.
Column (1) in Table 6 reports that initial mentor interest strongly and significantly predicts subsequent commercialization for ventures in R&D-intensive sectors. For ventures in other sectors, the coefficient estimate for aggregate mentor interest is weak and insignificant. To investigate the role of documented intellectual capital and having established a legal business entity, columns (2) to (4) restrict the analysis to ventures in R&D-intensive sectors. Among such ventures, the coefficient estimate for aggregate mentor interest is more positive and significant for ventures that are based on academic research or possess IP at entry than for those without. In contrast, having a legal business entity at entry weakens the predictive power of mentor interest. The results suggest that mentors can assess the commercial potential of a venture's intellectual capital in R&D-intensive sectors, and that intellectual capital does not simply function as a signal of a venture's maturity.
To confirm that heterogeneity across venture sectors is not specific to the prediction of commercialization, we use receipt of angel and/or VC financing as an alternative outcome measure.
Columns (A1) and (A2) of Table 7 show that, among ventures in R&D-intensive sectors, aggregate mentor interest positively and significantly predicts the probabilities of raising over $1 million and over $5 million in angel/VC funding. Columns (A3) and (A4) in Table 7 show that aggregate mentor interest positively and significantly predicts raising venture financing and commercializing, but does not predict raising venture financing without commercializing. These results indicate that mentors are not simply predicting the preferences of investors in R&D-intensive sectors. 19 In contrast, Panel B in Table 7 shows that mentor interest does not predict angel and/or VC financing for ventures in non-R&D-intensive sectors; all of the coefficient estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. Therefore, we find that the heterogeneity in the predictive power of aggregate mentor interest between R&D-intensive sectors and non-R&D-intensive sectors applies to other important venture milestones.
Discussion
We find that it is possible to use succinct venture summaries to predict the future commercial viability of ventures in R&D-intensive sectors (hardware, energy, and life sciences). In this section we discuss interpretations and alternative explanations of our key results .
What does aggregate mentor interest measure?
Aggregate mentor interest is an imperfect measure of idea quality at an early stage. We define "idea quality" to encompass all nonhuman aspects of the venture, i.e., the capital assets that encompass the underlying business proposition, potential market, and traction. 20 The brief venture summaries contain two types of information: a description of the idea and limited information on the background of the team. Mentors could express interest in response to any or all of the information provided, which could affect our results in two ways.
The first possibility is that despite the venture summaries' emphasis on nonhuman capital, mentor interest measures team quality more than idea quality. But because much more variation is 19 Of the funded ventures in R&D-intensive sectors, 40 percent have not commercialized. In unreported regressions we find that the predictive power of mentor interest remains strong and significant within the sub-sample of ventures that never raised venture financing, further confirming that our findings are not driven by mentors' prediction of investor preferences.
20 Bernstein et al. (2015) also consider traction to signal the quality of nonhuman assets.
evident in the information available to mentors about the ideas than about the teams, it is unlikely that variation in observed team quality drives the outcomes that we observe. Bernstein et al. (2015) show that investors respond positively to signals of team quality, such as being educated at a top university like MIT or working for a top company like Google. All of the entrepreneurs in our sample are MIT-educated, and the venture summaries contain no information about entrepreneurs' work experience. Importantly, we do not argue that there is no variation among the entrepreneurs;
we are pointing out that it would be difficult for mentors to infer characteristics pertinent to entrepreneurial success, such as perseverance, without meeting the entrepreneurs. Nor is mentor interest likely to be driven by entrepreneurs' ability to pitch their ideas, since the venture summaries are all written by the same staff member and standardized in tone and format. Consistent with these arguments, our regression results show that aggregate mentor interest is far more strongly correlated with observed venture characteristics than with observed entrepreneur characteristics (Table 3) .
The second possibility is that mentors express interest for reasons other than their subjective evaluation of idea quality and unrelated to the ventures' likelihood of success. This scenario would result in measurement errors in our explanatory variable, which would bias our estimates toward zero. We thus interpret our results as conservative estimates of mentors' ability to assess venture ideas' commercial potential at an early stage. Furthermore, we have no reason to believe that measurement errors differentially affect the evaluation of R&D-intensive and non-R&D-intensive ventures; none of the mentors in our field interviews mentioned applying distinctive criteria to different types of ventures.
Are mentors recognizing high-quality ideas or excluding non-serious ideas?
VMS imposes minimal screening on venture ideas. One concern is thus that our sample of ventures could consist largely of self-evidently non-serious ideas and exhibit more variance in quality than the business plans that angel investors and VCs typically evaluate, a scenario that would undermine the external validity of our findings. We present four sets of evidence to demonstrate that mentors are not simply differentiating between serious and non-serious ideas and that our key findings apply to serious entrepreneurial pursuits. First, columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show that the predictive power of mentor interest is robust to excluding ventures that elicited low mentor interest; Figure 4 also shows meaningful variations among the venture ideas that received above-median interest. Second, we find that the predictive power of aggregate mentor interest is strong among ventures that possess documented intellectual capital in R&D-intensive sectors. These ideas are typically based on years of intensive research and represent significant commitment on the part of the entrepreneur. Third, Table A .1 in the Appendix shows that our key findings hold when we restrict our analysis to ventures of serious entrepreneurs who pursue the venture full-time. 21 Given the high opportunity costs facing MIT graduates, the entrepreneurs are unlikely to make this decision lightly. Finally, Table A .2 in the Appendix shows that aggregate mentor interest also predicts successful exit (i.e., acquisition or initial public offering) among ventures that will be funded by VCs. Because there are only 56 such ventures and 5 exits, the evidence is merely suggestive. Nevertheless, it complements the previous findings, which jointly indicate that mentors are recognizing high-quality ideas rather than simply excluding non-serious ideas.
Are mentors able to predict the commercial viability of early-stage R&D-intensive ventures because of their unique expertise?
External validity would be questionable if the inconsistency in the predictive power of mentor interest between R&D-intensive and non-R&D-intensive ventures were driven by mentors' unique scientific or industry-specific expertise. Given the wide variety in mentors' backgrounds (Table   2) , however, few of those who evaluate a given venture possess relevant expertise. In unreported 21 The entrepreneur's full-time commitment to the venture usually occurs after joining VMS.
regressions, the analysis is performed using only mentors without a doctoral degree or venturespecific industry expertise. The results confirm that neither specialized training and knowledge nor industry expertise is a critical factor in mentors' collective ability to differentiate venture ideas.
Conclusion
Early-stage business ideas are rudimentary in nature and reliant on many assumptions, but we find and change their business ideas. Typically, therefore, the early-stage business proposition less closely matches the version that the entrepreneurs ultimately commit to, and thus the early-stage evaluation less consistently reflects the outcome.
In the absence of methods to reliably screen venture ideas, early-stage investors in non-R&D-intensive sectors may base their screening efforts on founding teams' human capital (Bernstein et al., 2015) or adopt a "spray and pray" approach (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2015) . In these sectors, small initial investments may enable investors to gain valuable information on ventures' probability of success. In R&D-intensive sectors, by contrast, developing ideas that innovate on the technological frontier is typically associated with high fixed costs. Thus, in these sectors, careful screening of venture ideas is likely to remain a prudent investment strategy. (1) and (2) use as a mentor-interest measure the proportion or count of mentors who express initial interest but never meet with the venture. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to ventures that elicited interest from more than four mentors, the maximum initial mentor team size. In columns (5) and (6), the sample consists of ventures that met with VMS mentors twice at most and had no repeat interactions with any mentors. All regressions include controls and fixed effects for academic research, intellectual property at entry, business entity at entry, mentors met at least twice, mentor meetings, entrepreneur characteristics, sector, year and month of affiliation with VMS. Standard errors are robust and clustered by venture sector and year of affiliation with VMS. Significance: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
(1) (1) (2) (3) Table 1 . All regressions include controls and fixed effects for academic research, intellectual property at entry, business entity at entry, mentors met at least twice, mentor meetings, entrepreneur characteristics, sector, and year and month of affiliation with VMS. Standard errors are robust and clustered by venture sector and year of affiliation with VMS. 
